Theoretical analyses of party positions commonly assume that parties act as teams to maximize their legislative representation. This assumption runs counter to another line of theorizing in which individual legislators maximize their own chances of winning reelection.
Introduction
This paper presents a model of ideological voters choosing between two competing parties. These parties are made up of election-oriented, self-interested incumbents running for re-election in districts. Furthermore, the model assumes that voters, possibly due to informational constraints, can only observe one universal party position for each party. That is, members of each party are forced to run under one common \platform." However, the candidates of the party do not have identical goals -each candidate represents a particular district, and wishes to win her particular district. The model assumes that the party position that voters use to decide which party to support is determined by current incumbents in the party. This can either be interpreted literally, as incumbents voting based on majority rule on a platform, or as an approximation of voters perceiving the aggregate behavior of partisans during the last legislative session and thereby observing the implicit party positions. (For ease of argument the model uses the literal interpretation.) Finally, the model assumes that incumbents are not certain about voter choices. This is represented by a valence term in voter utilities that makes all voters more likely to support one party over the other, independent of ideology. These and other supporting axioms are formalized in section three.
The basic argument is as follows. In this setup, there exists a cut-point such that all voters left of the cut-point support the left party, and all voters right of the cut-point support the right party. We will show that each incumbent has induced ordinal preferences that correspond to the preferences of the median voter of the district she represents. As long as each party won at least some districts in the last election, the median incumbent in the left (right) party will desire a platform left (right) of the preferences of the median voter in the median district. Since one platform is left of center, and the other platform is right of center, the platforms are diverged.
While the basic argument above for divergence is fairly simple, working through the model in detail yields other, more subtle, testable predictions. These predictions are discussed in sections four and¯ve. The degree of divergence remains large even as the uncertainty about valence becomes small (unlike Calvert (1985) and similar models). In section four we will show that if the distribution of districts is symmetrical, there is a sense in which platforms at the¯rst and third quartiles of district medians is stable. We will show the ordering of parties (left and right) endures over time. We will show that parties that do well in the past tend to moderate and therefore do better than they would have otherwise in the future. Perhaps most surprisingly of all, we will show that if the distribution of districts is asymmetrical (as might be caused by majority-minority districting), a party can be permanently electorally disadvantaged, even with ideological voters and°exible party platforms.
In section six, we will contrast the districted case above with a party list, proportional representation system. Surprisingly, most of the conclusions remain the same, with the distribution of voters replacing the role of the distribution of district medians. Of course, if the distribution of districts does not equal the distribution of voters, there may be signi¯cant policy implications. For example, party positions may be further apart, and election results may be less sensitive to economic shocks.
Past Literature
The seminal analytical model of electoral competition among parties, due to Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) , begins with the assumption that parties are teams. All candidates and legislators within a party unite around a common goal of winning control of government and present a common ideological position. Voters choose among parties on the basis of their relative distance from the national party platforms. These assumptions lead to a powerful prediction { the Median Voter Theorem. When electoral competition in a two-party system is waged along one dimension ideological spectrum, the parties will converge to the ideal point of the median voter. Many variants on this model have been developed, allowing, for example, open entry, multiple numbers of parties, varieties of electoral laws, and strategic voting.
1 This important line of inquiry, however, retains the assumption that political parties 1 There is an extensive theoretical literature predicting platform divergence based factors such as entry act as teams. Every politician within a party works for the common good in her or his party, even at the expense of the individual's own electoral fortunes.
The assumption that parties are teams runs counter to a second line of analytical inquiry in Political Science. Politicians, David Mayhew famously argued, single-mindedly seek election. They are self-interested and act in ways to protect and improve their own positions.
As a result, in a system like the U.S., legislators are very responsive to the preferences of the voters in their own districts, and parties resemble somewhat disorganized groups more than teams. (See also, Fiorina, 1980, and Krehbiel, 2000) . Robertson (1976) criticizes the application of the Downsian model to the United Kingdom because, even in a parliament with strong parties, the parties are internally divided into factions and individual politicians' interests; they are not teams. Surprisingly little theoretical research has approached the tension between the rational choice models of parties and the rational choice models of candidates.
Ours is not, of course, the¯rst model to extend the Downsian framework by examining internal party con°icts and organization. There are two important strands of theorizing about internal party decisions. The¯rst line of theory assumes competition across many di®erent districts or constituencies. Snyder (1994) analyzes a model similar to ours, but his model is deterministic. That model yields indi®erence or°at parts of politicians' revealed preferences and multiple equilibria. Under voter uncertainty, though, politicians running for single member districts are never indi®erent about what position their party takes. Even a little uncertainty on the part of candidates induces politicians to maximize their probabilities deterrence, politicians' policy preferences, voter abstention, primary elections, valence issues, party activists, and special interest groups. Examples include Aranson and Ordeshook (1972) , Wittman (1977 Wittman ( , 1983 , Enelow and Hinich (1981) , Aldrich (1983) , Palfrey (1984) , Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985) , Calvert (1985) , Aldrich and McGinnis (1989) , Cox (1990) , Ingberman and Villani (1993) , Londregan and Romer (1993) , Baron (1994 ), Snyder (1994 , Snyder and Ting (2002) , Poutvaara (2003) , Scho¯eld (2004) , Serra (2005) , and Callander (2005) . With the exceptions of Snyder (1994) and Snyder and Ting (2002) , however, these models either explicitly or implicitly deal with a single district or parties with collective preferences.
and produces strong preference orderings over the party platforms.
In fact, the relevant literature goes back much farther, at least to Robertson's (1976) informal discussion of the logic of party strategy. He argues that one of the crucial functions of political parties is to establish connections across the potentially unrelated races for di®erent legislative seats, that one means of doing this is to provide national party positions on salient issues, and that natural intra-party divisions will arise in deciding what these positions should be. Austen-Smith (1984 , 1986 extends and re¯nes Robertson's insights by analyzing game-theoretic models in which candidates announce individual platforms to appeal to their districts, but must also commit to an aggregate party platform that will be implemented as policy. 2 Calvert and Isaac (1981) model the potential tensions between a party's legislators and the president. 3 We will assume a simpler structure. Politicians decide using majority rule within their legislative caucus what platform they wish to implement.
A second strand of the literature assumes that politicians or party activists themselves have policy preferences. Aldrich (1983) , Aldrich and McInnis (1989) , Poutvaara (2003) , Gomberg et al. (2004) , and others treat parties as collections of \activists" or primary voters with policy preferences, and endogenize both party membership and party positions.
Most recently, Roemer (1998 Roemer ( , 2002 ) models internal party decision-making using a solution concept he calls \Party Unity Nash Equilibria." He assumes that parties are composed of 2 Austen-Smith (1984) models two parties that compete for control of an n-member legislature by running candidates in each of n single-member districts. Each candidate chooses an individual platform, and these platforms are then aggregated via a \party constitution" into a single position. This is the position that all members of the party will support once elected. Voters know the party constitutions, and vote accordingly. Austen-Smith shows that the parties' positions converge in equilibrium, but individual candidates' platforms do not. He also shows that (pure-strategy) equilibria may fail to exist even if the policy space is unidimensional. 3 Calvert and Isaac (1981) three types of actors { militants who care about \publicity," reformists who care about policy outcomes, and opportunists who care only about winning o±ce { and choose their platforms by unanimity rule. In these models there is just one constituency, and internal party con°ict is driven by di®erences in party members' policy preferences (or lack of such preferences).
We will maintain the assumption that politicians solely seek to win their own seats, and show that they most want a party platform equal to their own districts' median. This may look like politicians have their own preferences, but in fact they merely want to do what gets them elected.
Basic Model
There are two parties, X and Y , that compete for control of government. The parties choose policy platforms from a policy space Z ½ R. Lower case z denotes a generic policy position and x and y denote the platforms of the parties.
Every candidate for o±ce belongs to one and only one party. All politicians in a party run under that party's label and can not distinguish themselves from that label. Each politician seeks to win his or her own seat in the legislature. The utility of politician j in party X is Q j X = P r(j W ins), and the utility of politician j in party Y is Q j Y = P r(j W ins).
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Voters choose between the parties on the basis of two factors. First, voters compare parties' policy platforms. We will make the standard assumption that voters have singlepeaked policy preferences, but allow a general functional form. Each voter has an ideal policy platform, denoted as w. Write the spatial component of the utility function, using the lower case u, as ¡u(z ¡ w). The overall utility that a voter receives, denoted with an upper case U, is the sum of their valence and spatial preferences. The utility a voter receives if party X holds o±ce is U(x; w; v x ) = v x ¡ u(x ¡ w) and the utility a voter receives if party Y holds o±ce is U(y; w; v y ) = v y ¡ u(y ¡ w). The di®erential in utility between party X and Y is denoted The cut-point can be thought of as the point along Z such that any voter with an ideal point at that point is indi®erent between the parties. Given policy positions, the cut-point depends on the random variable v, and the expected value of the cut-point can be written
Stronger assumptions about the utility function allow for explicit solutions for the cutpoint c. With quadratic utilities, which are commonly assumed in the literature,
In examples below we will use this characterization of the cutpoint. Inspection of this result reveals that the cut-point need not lie between the two parties. For example, suppose that
Three propositions that characterize electoral competition generally follow from the more generic assumptions. These propositions characterize properties of the cut-point that are not dependent on the electoral system. The¯rst proposition guarantees that the cut-point is well de¯ned, or only one party holds seats. In what follows, we will consider the strategies of the parties across two election cycles. Each cycle is, in turn, divided into two parts. In the¯rst part of an election cycle, the platform is determined. In the second part, the valence shock is realized and therefore the cut-point 
Platform Choice in the Single-Member District System
In districted systems, candidates run and individuals vote within particular districts; votes are not transferable across districts; the candidate who wins the most votes in a district wins the seat; and the total number of seats won is the total number of districts won.
Let the median voter of a district be designated by m, and let H(z) be the CDF of district medians. Assume H is continuous. The cut-point for a given election and the median voter of a given district jointly determine which party wins that district for that election. (Since H is continuous we can ignore district medians exactly on the cut-point since they constitute measure zero) For example, if x < y then all districts such that m < c choose the candidate of party X and all districts such that m > c choose the candidate of party Y . Given voters' assumed strategies, candidates' expected utility functions are easily described. A candidate, j, from party X has expected utility Proposition 4.1 immediately implies that it is natural to describe incumbents as having an \induced ideal point" equal to his or her district median. Uncertainty, which enters through the term v, produces the well-de¯ned preference function described in Proposition 3.1. Legislators will have strong orders over the platform choices because their probability of winning declines smoothly as the cut-point moves away from the district's median voter's ideal point. The amount of uncertainty a®ects the shape of the preference function of each legislator, but even a little uncertainty will generate a well-de¯ned preference function in which legislators have strong preference orders over alternative policy platforms.
5 A legislator's ordinal preferences, then, will be the same as the median voter of his or her district, but the legislator and voter won't have the same cardinal utility { that will depend on the probability function, G.
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This result is distinct from two other lines of thinking. First, uncertainty guarantees a well-ordered preference function and prevents multiple equilibria. In a deterministic model (Snyder, 1994) , the induced utility function of incumbents may have \°at spots" or \regions of indi®erence." The intuition is that, for a given value of y, if valence \jumps" at some points then there are regions of x that induce the same probability of winning for a candidate with given m. Full support of v guarantees that incumbent preferences are well-behaved.
The equilibrium derived below would still exist, but there may be others.
Second, Proposition 4.1 di®ers qualitatively from the assumption that politicians have their own personal preferences over policy, as in Wittman (1977 Wittman ( , 1983 , Calvert (1985) , and Roemer (2002) . In those models, the politicians in a party have common policy preferences and want policy to move in that direction. Uncertainty may lead to divergence, but the degree of divergence is a function of the variance of the distribution of the shocks. 7
5 It is worth noting that candidate cardinal utility is not the same as a representative voter's cardinal utility. Candidate utility is¯ltered through the distribution of potential valence shocks. Only the ordinal preferences are preserved. While this distinction does not matter for purposes of this paper, it may be important when thinking about extensions (such as platforms maximizing average incumbent utility) or welfare analysis of the results. The loss of cardinal information also implies that thinking of our legislature as a \citizen" legislature made of representative citizens with policy preferences is not quite correct. 6 It is also worth noting that the induced ideal points of candidates are independent of the other party's platform. This does not mean, of course, that a candidate is indi®erent about the other party's platform. In fact, all candidates in a party prefer the other party's platform to be as extreme as possible, as that increases the probability of winning. 7 In this model the irrelevance of degree of uncertainty relies on the assumption that candidates do not have direct policy preferences. Suppose one extended the model to give incumbents a direct preference for a particular platform in addition to being reelected. The less uncertainty, the more a candidate could a®ord to support a policy that deviates from the median voter of her district. Whether this would lead to more or Proposition 4.1 ensures that incumbent preferences are well de¯ned, single-peaked, with ideal points equal to the district medians the incumbents represent. The assumption of majority rule within parties yields an explicit characterization of the equilibrium platforms of the parties and leads to the prediction that when parties are not uni¯ed teams they will diverge.
We can now make use of the two period structure introduced at the end of section 3.
There are two time periods 0; 1 such that x 0 and y 0 are determined exogenously and x ¤ 1 and y ¤ 1 are determined via majority rule by the incumbents from period 0. 8 Assume that 0 < H(c 0 ) < 1 so neither party was completely wiped out in the period 0 election.
Assume the inverse of H(z), H ¡1 (µ) exists for µ 2 (0; 1). By the median voter theorem, each party's platform in period 1 (x ¤ 1 ; or y ¤ 1 ) will be the median of the induced ideal points of candidates of that party who won in period 0. 
Party order is preserved over time.
Parties take positions on opposite sides of the median district.
With the introduction of a stability concept, one can derive a very simple characterization of the party platforms: one party will locate at the 25th percentile of the distribution of voter ideal points and the other at the 75th percentile.
less divergence depends on whether incumbents tend to be more moderate or extreme than their districts. 8 We will assume throughout that x 0 6 = y 0 . If x 0 = y 0 , the party that receives the favorable shock will win all of the seats. It is unclear, then, what a party is if it has no seats.
Consider the case when cut-point in period 0 is H ¡1 (1=2). That is, districts left of the median voted for one party while the other districts voted for the other party; each party won 50% of the vote. Then the party platforms for period 1 are x ¤ 1 = H ¡1 (1=4) and
The left party platform is the¯rst quartile of districts and the right party platform is the third quartile. If H() is anti-symmetric there is a sense in which this outcome is stable.
De¯ne platforms x 0 ; y 0 as \zero-valence stable" if whenever v 0 = v 1 = 0, x 0 = x 0 , and
Proposition 3.3. Quartile Voter Theorem. For any symmetric u, anti-symmetric H,
This result provides an interesting analogy to the Median Voter Theorem. When parties are not uni¯ed teams but their members must run under a common label, and when the distribution of district median ideal points is anti-symmetric, the cut-point between the parties will divide the electorate equally at 1/2, but the party platforms will not converge.
Rather, one will locate at the ideal point of the 25th percentile voter and the other will locate at the ideal point of the 75th percentile voter, which correspond to the medians within each of the parties.
Comparative Statics and Empirical Implications
The model carries predictions about the equilibrium platforms or policies of the parties, the shares of the votes, and the e®ects of changes in the exogenous features. We will focus on two such features, the valence shock v and the distribution of district medians H .
E®ects of Short-term forces
Party platform choices depend on the random valence term v, which re°ects economic times, scandals, and other factors that indicate the ability of the party to produce commonly 9 Whether platforms are in any sense dynamically stable over time for a particular stochastic process de¯ning v is an interesting question beyond the scope of this particular paper. An interesting and subtle implication of the model is that short-term forces and party positioning interact in their e®ects on aggregate vote shares or seat shares. To see this clearly, consider the case of quadratic utilities. As noted earlier, the cut-point will be of the form
. The¯rst term is just the mid-point between the parties, but the second term is the valence shock weighted by the distance between the parties. Consideration of this last term indicates that the more converged the parties are the more a valence shock will a®ect changes in the cut-point and, thus, party platform strategies in later elections.
However, if parties take highly divergent positions, short-term forces will have muted e®ects on the cut-point, and thus on°uctuations in the division of the vote. One can also analyze the formula for c to study how valence directly a®ects positioning.
Three comparative-static type results deserve emphasis. ² x ¤ 1 and y ¤ 1 are increasing in c 0 . Past good performance causes a party to moderate; past bad performance causes a party to move to the extreme.
. Past good performance causes good future performance, on average.
² Suppose that H is continuously di®erentiable, v 1 = 0 and u is symmetric, and denote the¯rst derivative of H as h. The derivative of c 1 with respect to c 0 yields c
The¯rst of these results indicates that party platform choices depend on past party performance. If times are good for one party, say the party to the right, both parties will move away from that party's direction, to the left, and the party to the right can expect to gain seats in the next election. Parties that do well tend to moderate, while parties that do poorly tend to move to the extreme. As a party shrinks, the few remaining incumbents tend to come from more extreme districts. In their pursuit of their own individual re-election, these incumbents pull their party further to the extreme.
The second and third results describes a force that can create longevity for the majority party. As noted in Proposition 3.3 symmetry in u and G means that one can expect an even split in the shares of seats won. But, as the second and third results suggest, the actual division of seats depends on the values of the shocks. If a party enjoyed a positive shock in period 0 and the party platforms were at the¯rst and third quartile, then the advantaged party will win a majority. If v 1 is not su±ciently negative, then that party will win a majority again in period 1.
While a party gains an advantage from past electoral success, the fourth result shows that under many circumstances the advantage is less than the original surge. For example, when the distribution of ideal points is uniform, the derivative of c 1 with respect to c 0 equals 1/2. Hence, the period 1 cut-point, if v 1 = 0, corrects half of the gain from the period 0 shock. While the formula above is not always less than 1 for all distributions, it is for several commonly assumed distributions, such as the uniform, normal, and logistic.
This result is consistent with observed mid-term seat loss observed in the U.S., France, and other nations. Suppose during a typical election v ¼ 0. However, if a party wins the presidency in a given year, that is evidence that the valence shock was in favor of that party for that year. One should therefore expect a coattail e®ect of more members of that party winning legislative seats that year. However, in the upcoming election the valence shock will tend back toward its typical value of zero, and some of the legislative gains will be lost. This will be observed as a mid-term seat loss -although, according to the model, the loss will typically be less than the coattail e®ect.
While this paper does not model long-term strategic consequences of repeated play, the above process suggests that a party could be wiped out by repeated negative shocks. There are several possible reactions to this prediction. First, in many speci¯c cases these shocks would have to be very large. For example, if H is uniform, a party could repeatedly sustain negative valence shocks equal to one quarter of the seats inde¯nitely without being wiped out. Second, as a party grows smaller, the assumption that platforms are determined by incumbents and only incumbents becomes more strained. This assumption was made to clarify and simplify the argument of the paper, but could of course be relaxed. An obvious extension to the model is to give some weight to challengers in the party, and have that weight increase as the number of challengers relative to incumbents increases. This will cause a badly beaten party to eventually begin to moderate, and thus bounce back. Finally, one could keep the model as is and embrace the prediction. Two-party democracies are not necessarily perfectly stable for all time. Just as in the long-run we are all dead, perhaps two-party systems, with su±ciently pernicious H and G distributions, are doomed to eventually experience the slow collapse of one of the paries. In particular, a su±ciently perverse gerrymander could lead to the complete and nearly inevitable destruction of one of the parties.
These results should be contrasted with the Downsian model. In that framework, because the platforms are the same, shocks cause one party to win all seats, and shocks will change all seats or none.
The dependence of current party performance on past party performance in the model has wide-reaching implications for many empirical studies of elections. At the very least, one should expect autocorrelation over time of party electoral performance. Studies of elections over multiple years (such as measures of swing-ratios) that ignore such auto-correlation may understate standard errors. Studies that use lagged election results as a proxy for omitted independent variables should observe a positive correlation between current and past elections. However, such a correlation does not imply that the lagged election results are actually correlated with the omitted variable.
The cross time-dependence of cut-points predicted by the model suggests at least two direct empirical tests. At the very least one should look for and measure cut-points, and check to see if they follow an auto-regressive process. If one is willing to take the model very seriously, one could also test the speci¯c formula E(c
Of course to perform the regressions suggested above one would need estimates of c and H. Here is one possible approach. Label the parties as X and Y and assume x < y. Letm i be the estimated ideology of district i. 10 A natural estimator for H would be the empirical distribution of districts d H (z); the fraction of districts with ideology less than z. To estimate
Where ± i (z) = 1 ifm i < z and district i voted for party Y orm i > z and district i voted for party X. Otherwise ± i (z) = 0. In other words, district i contributes loss if it votes for the \wrong" party. In this paper's stylized model, districts never vote for the wrong party, and so such a correction would be unnecessary.
Implications for Theories of Gerrymandering and Electoral System Bias
One of the functions of gerrymandering is to alter legislative district lines so as to bene¯t one party over another. Most of the extensive literature on gerrymandering focuses on a particular de¯nition of this concept { electoral system bias. A system is unbiased if, in a hypothetical election in which the parties split the vote evenly, the parties win equal shares of the seats. Deviations in seat shares from 50-50, when the votes are split 50-50, are taken as the degree of bias. This is a characteristic of the function H. Empirical research implements this de¯nition by regressing seat shares on vote shares and then examining the predicted seat shares of a party when its vote share equals .5. This idea is used to compare electoral systems broadly.
The model suggests an alternative way to think about the overall degree of electoral bias produced by gerrymandering. As noted above, most analysts think of partisan gerrymandering only in terms of the direct mapping from votes to seats, or more precisely what is the value of H(c) when the parties divide the electorate evenly.
Spatial models that predict convergence are uninformative about this question. In Downs's model, where parties are teams, gerrymandering has no a®ect on electoral outcomes. 11 The parties converge to the national median and elections in all districts end in ties, regardless of H. The same is true in models where there are no parties and candidates are free to choose whatever position they want within their districts.
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In this model, gerrymandering can have two a®ects. First, it alters the seat shares received by each party directly by changing the shape of H. Second, altering the shape of H can indirectly a®ect the share of seats won by a party because it can lead parties to adopt new platforms. The full e®ect of the gerrymander, then, would be the change in seats of the party that resulted from the change in H and the change in platforms.
The¯rst e®ect is the e®ect most political scientists look for. Does the shape of H created by a districting plan imply a disadvantage for one of the parties, holding the parties¯xed at their positions.
The second e®ect, however, has been missed in the voluminous formal literature on districting and gerrymandering. A gerrymander can force the opposing party to adopt a platform that makes it a permanent minority. Consider the possible e®ect of racial districting.
Racial gerrymandering may change the makeup of Democratic incumbents by creating a disproportionate number of extremely left-wing districts in that party. That, in turn, might 11 Non spatial models of voter behavior, such as voters with¯xed partisan loyalty, can predict electoral outcome changes from gerrymanders. For an example see Shotts (2001) .
12 Note in a Downsian model, Gerrymanders can still e®ect policy outcomes by moving the median legislator. Shotts (2002) provides a formal model describing gerrymandering given purely ideological legislators. Epstein and O'Halloran (1999) provide an empirical case of the median legislator being moved to accommodate racial minority-majority districts. In their example the median legislator becomes, perversely, less friendly to minority rights.
change the platform of the Democratic party as well, most likely shifting it to the left. Thus, the party balance can depend on the shape of how districts are distributed, in addition to the median (or average) district.
To illustrate this more precisely, consider the following examples.
Example 5.0. Let voter utility be symmetric and let H(z) = z where z 2 [0; 1].
The uniform distribution implies that the zero-valence stable cut-point is 1/2, the parties will locate at 1/4 and 3/4, and the parties will each win half of the seats.
Example 5.1. Let voter utility be quadratic, and let H(z) = z 2 where z 2 [0; 1].
As shown in the appendix, the cut-point corresponding to the unique zero-variance stable platforms (given x < y) is approximately .653. The left party locates at .462; the right party is at .845; and the right party wins approximately 57% of the seats (i.e., H (c) ¼ 0:427).
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Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the underlying distribution of voters' ideal points is the same in both of these circumstances but that a clever political cartographer managed to reshape district lines so that the initial uniform distribution of district medians became quadratic. Doing so has several e®ects.
First, it changes the quantiles of the distribution of district medians. In example 4.1., the median district is at .707, instead of .5, the 25th percentile district is at .5, and the 75th percentile is at .866. That is, the left party with its long tail of districts becomes relatively more extreme, the right party relatively more moderate, and the left party receives only 40% of the vote.
Second, relative to these quantiles, the left party is more extreme and the right party is One could argue that the measure o®ered above { the expected or zero-order seat loss associated with the change in H { is preferable to the traditional de¯nition of bias. The enormous bias predicted by the traditional measure is not usually in empirical analyses an in-sample value. But, as our discussion highlights, there is a conceptual problem as well:
traditional bias does not account for the fact that the parties have changed their positions to accommodate the new districting map.
As discussed above, the model also provides a speci¯c formula for the e®ects of gerry- The gerrymander suggested by these examples is severe in another sense. It substantially altered the policy outcomes relative to the preference of the median voter. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the median is at z = :5. In example 5.0, policy will be either z = :25 or :75, depending on which party wins. In example 5.1, the right party will win and policy will be at z = :845. This is very extreme relative to the median voter's preferences, and all voters but those to the right of the z = :8(= (:845 + :75)=2) will be worse o®. 14 For an example of thinking about bias in terms of voter welfare, see Coate and Knight (2005) . They show that in some circumstances a biased seats/votes curve can actually increase voter welfare. However, in their model party platforms are¯xed. The model indicates that to fully assess the welfare implications of bias, one must also account for how the shape of districts impacts party platforms.
of voters ideal points as F (z), and assume F (z) is continuous and has inverse for ¿ 2 (0; 1)
The left party wins a share s of votes (and of seats) equal to s´F (c) and the right party wins 1 ¡ F (c) share of votes.
In the party list case, F (z) plays the same role as H (z) in the districted case. Nevertheless it is important to remember the distinction. F (z) is a description of voter ideal points across an entire nation; H (z) is a description of median voter ideal points, district by district.
We 
The¸th candidate on party Y 's list has the following utility function
The above equations de¯ne candidates' preferences over party platforms. As in the singlemember district model, candidates' expected utilities can be written in terms of voters' utility functions. For x < y,¸2 (0; 1):
and
Symmetric equations hold for x > y.
Letx(y;¸) be the most-preferred platform of a candidate who is at position¸on party X's list, and letỹ(x;¸0) be the most-preferred platform for a candidate at position¸0 on party Y 's list. As the following proposition shows,x(y;¸) andỹ(x;¸0) are well-de¯ned.
15 Unless the policy space Z is bounded, F ¡ 1 (¿) may be unde¯ned at ¿ = 0 and ¿ = 1. Since these represent measure zero worth of candidates on the party list one can safely ignore these cases.
Proposition 6.1. Suppose y¸0. For all¸2 (0; 1) and y, Q X (x; y;¸) is either doublepeaked or single-peaked in x, and has a unique global maximum. This global maximum is attained atx(y;¸) = max(F ¡1 (s); y).
A symmetric result holds for the case y · 0, and an analogous proposition holds for Q Y (x; y;¸). The preferences of the person exactly at the top and bottom of the list are somewhat pathological, but they constitute a set of measure zero and so are ignored.
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This result has an interesting implication for the understanding politicians' preferences under list systems. There is a seeming divide among political scientists studying districted and list systems. Those studying districted systems, such as the United States, frequently assert that politicians just want to win o±ce, while those studying list systems often maintain policy-oriented politicians. Proposition 5.1 suggests that the di®erence is more apparent than real. Election oriented politicians' positions on the list induce policy-oriented preference functions.
Candidates near the top of their party's list have the strongest preference for adopting extreme policies. The intuition is straightforward, and re°ects the trade-o® between a party's expected vote-share and the variance of the party's vote-share. Consider a candidate at the 25th percentile on the party X's list (¸= 1=4). This candidate wins a seat as long as X wins at least 25% of the vote. If X chooses a platform that diverges considerably from Y 's platform, then there will be a subset of voters with a strong policy-based preference for party X. If x < y, for example, then voters with z < (x+ y)=2 all prefer X to Y on policy grounds, and this preference grows more intense the smaller is z. Voters with a strong policy-based preference for party X are very likely to vote for X, since it will require a large, negative valence shock to cause them to change their minds and vote for Y . Thus, even if party X is unlikely to win a majority of the vote, it might be very likely to win 25 percent or more of the vote. On the other hand, if X's platform is close to Y 's, then there is a higher degree of uncertainty about X's vote-share, since the valence shocks dominate voter choices. Although X expected vote-share may be higher, the variance of it's vote-share will also be higher, and the probability that X wins at least 25% of the vote may fall. As shown in Proposition 5.1, if y > 0 then the probability that X wins at least 25 percent of the vote is maximized when
x is equal to the 25th percentile of the voter ideal-point distribution.
By contrast, candidates low on their party's list all want the same platform, a \me too" platform equal to that of the other party. Such candidates actually welcome some degree of electoral uncertainty, since their only chance of winning a seat in the legislature lies in a favorable valence shock for their party.
Suppose that each party's incumbent legislators are placed at the top of the party's list. Recall that each party's platform is chosen by simple majority rule among the party's incumbents. Denote the current period as period 1, and let s 0 be party X's seat-share from the election in period 0. Assume that s 0 2 (0; 1), so neither party was completely wiped out in period 0's election. Although some incumbents do not have single-peaked preferences, their preferences satisfy a weaker condition that guarantees the existence of a unique majority winner. The equilibrium platforms are simply characterized, as follows.
Proposition 6.2. Suppose F ¡1 and u are di®erentiable, s 0 6 = 0:5, and 0 < s 0 < 1, Then the equilibrium core platforms for the current election satisfy (i)
According to Proposition 6.2 each party's platform for the election at time 1 is equal to the median of the ideal points of the voters who supported the party in the election at time 0.
In case (i) x ¤ 1 < 0 < y ¤ 1 , and in case (ii) y ¤ 1 < 0 < x ¤ 1 . Note that the equilibrium platforms are always on opposite sides of the overall median ideal point.
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Proposition 6.2 is nearly identical to Proposition 4.2 (as long as the cut-point is never exactly at the median,) and so most the conclusions that derive from Proposition 4.2 (di-17 If the cut-point is at the median, there exists a convergent equilibrium as well as two divergent equilibria.
The intuition is that the pivotal incumbent has a 50 percent chance of winning in both the convergent and divergent equilibria.
vergence, past performance e®ects current platforms and performance, and performance depends on the entire distribution of voters) apply, with one major exception: there is no guarantee that party ordering will be the same. If one were to exogenously impose party ordering then the standard predictions would apply. If one does not impose the restriction exogenously, then there is nothing about the model that prevents party's in part-list systems from \swapping" left-right positions.
Although similar results on party-positioning hold for list and districted systems, the model also helps clarify the di®erences between them.
First, induced preferences are well-de¯ned and concave for all legislators in the districted system, but oddities arise in the list system. Most notably, those legislators on the bottom of the list want perfect convergence exactly, as that plus a favorable shock is their only hope of winning a seat. The analogous legislators in districted systems are those in moderate districts or districts leaning toward the other party. Those in moderate districts want moderate platforms, while those in the \wrong districts" (left party politicians in districts right of the median and vice versa) want their party to be more conservative than the median district.
Second, electoral competition in the list system depends only on the distribution of voters' preferences, not the intermediary mapping of voters' preferences into districts and then into seats. Propositions 3.2 and 5.2 show that the platforms adopted by the parties depend on the relevant electoral distribution functions { either of voters' ideal points or of district median ideal points. If a particular country were to switch from a list system to a districted system or vice versa, party platforms may change signi¯cantly depending on the mapping of voters into districts. If, for example, voter ideology were driven by income, the distribution of ideology in the entire nation may have a thick right tail. A districted system, on the other hand, might be, district median by district median, more balanced. As example 3.1 illustrates, a right-skewed distribution can result in a small right-party. It is possible that this result may give some intuition for why socialist parties are relatively weak in districted systems and strong in party list systems.
Concluding Remarks
The Median Voter Theorem has provided a focal point for the spatial theory of politics.
Two parties, acting as teams to control government, will converge to the ideal point of the median voter in the electorate. But, parties are not teams -at least not in the strict sense that Downs and others have expressed it. Rather parties are collections of politicians motivated by their personal desire to hold o±ce as well as grander ideological goals. Legislators bene¯t from and enjoy personal bene¯ts from holding their own seat in the legislature. Starting from this assumption, we have arrived at a strikingly di®erent conclusion.
When parties are not teams, parties will represent the median of their elected o±cials, rather than the median of the electorate as a whole. This result applies equally to single member district systems and party list systems, which suggests that party divergence is a universal phenomenon driven by the personal interests of politicians. Politicians' desire to hold o±ce will lead parties to diverge. The degree of divergence expected is approximately the inter-quartile range within the electorate. There is a welfare implication for voters as well. When parties are not teams, the parties diverge, and one of the two parties' policy platforms will win and become law. The winning platform will deviate considerably from the median, and thus a majority of the voters would prefer a policy that is closer to the median. There is little voters can do to change this situation. The majority of politicians within each party support the divergent positions that the parties take: those positions maximize the politicians' chances of winning o±ce. Voters cannot achieve the same degree of coordination. They are left with a policy that is less than optimal for a large majority.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. We will only show the case x < y here. Consider two values z and z 0 , where, without loss of generality,
We need to show that ¢U (z; x; y; v) > ¢U(z 0 ; x; y; v) ; that is,
De¯ne ® and ® 0 implicitly by
Adding the two relations above and manipulating yields
Adding the two relations above and using the result ® + ® 0 = 1 yields
as desired.
To prove Proposition 3.2 we will¯rst prove two lemmas. For the second part, if v = 0 and party X's platform is at x and party Y 's platform is at y, then a voter with ideal point at y strictly prefers party Y to X and a voter with ideal point x strictly prefers party X to Y . Therefore by proposition 2.1 c(x; y; 0) exists and x < c(x; y; 0) < y. By continuity of ¢U(y; x; y; v) and ¢U(x; x; y; v) with respect to v, 9² such that 8jvj < ² a voter with ideal point at x still strictly prefers x to c(x; y; v) and a voter with ideal point at y still strictly prefers y to c(x; y; v). Therefore x < c(x; y; v) < y.
Note, Lemmas 3.1a and 23.1b imply that as long as the original cut-point lies between the two platforms, and platform shifts do not cross the cut-point, then the cut-point is monotonic in platforms. Roughly speaking, we need either small v combined with potentially large platform changes, or small to medium sized v (such that the cut-point stays between the parties) combined with small changes in platforms to ensure monotonicity.
Proof of Proposition 3.2 Case one is y 0 ¡ y < x 0 ¡ x. Let ± = y 0 ¡ y. Since ¢U(z; x; y; v) = ¢U(z + ±; x + ±; y + ±; v), c(x + ±; y + ±; v) = c(x; y; v) + ±. Therefore c(x + ±; y 
But this implies that the cut-point for ¡v is c(x; y; ¡v) = (x+y)=2¡± + . Therefore c(x; y; v)+ c(x; y; ¡v) = x + y = 2c(x; y; 0). If G is antisymmetric around zero, then the expected value of the cut-point is:
E(c(x; y)) = Since in equilibrium y is treated as a constant, u(x ¡ m) ¡ u(y ¡ m) represents the same preferences as u(x¡m). G is a CDF and therefore is monotonic. Any maximum of ¡u(x¡m)
is a minimum of u(x ¡m), a minimum of G(u(x¡m)) (by monotonicity), and a maximum for 1 ¡ G(u(x ¡ m)). Since m is a maximum for ¡u(x ¡ m), it is also a maximum for Q X (x; y; m). If v has full support, then G is strictly increasing. Now, u(x¡m) represents the opposite preferences to ¡u(x¡m), G(u(x¡m) ) represents the same preferences as u(x¡m) by strict monotonicity, and 1 ¡ G(u(x¡m)) represents the opposite preferences to G(u(x¡m)). The formulas in the text follow immediately.
Proof of Proposition 6.1. First, suppose x = y. Then s X = 1 if v > 0, s X = 0 if v < 0, and s X = 1=2 if v = 0. Thus, Q X (x; y; s) = P rob(v¸0) = 1=2 for all s.
Next, consider x < y. Then Q X (x; y; s) = P rob(¢U(F ¡1 (s); x; y; v)¸0) (1¡ s) ). Since F is symmetric about zero, 1 ¡ F (y) = F (¡y). Also, s < 1 ¡ F (y) for the case under consideration, so we have F ¡1 (s) < ¡y < 0 < y < F ¡1 (1¡s).
Again using the symmetry of F , ¡y ¡ F ¡1 ( 
In the proof of Proposition 6.1 we showed ¡u(y¡F ¡1 (s)) < ¡u(y ¡F ¡1 (1¡s)). Therefore a su±cient condition for the above relation to hold is
At s = s 0 =2 the above expression is satis¯ed. Taking derivative with respect to s yields
Note that dF ¡1 =ds > 0 and u 0 (z) < 0 if z < 0 and u 0 (z) > 0 if z > 0.
For case (iii) for the proposed coalition s < s 0 =2, the derivative is negative. Since the condition above is satis¯ed at s 0 =2, and the condition is decreasing in s, it must be satis¯ed for all s < s 0 =2. Therefore everyone in the proposed coalition strictly supports x ¤ 1 over x 0 .
For case (iv) the derivative is positive for s > s 0 =2 and therefore everyone in the coalition supports x over y. 
